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ABSTRACT 
 
The issue of privacy protection in video surveillance has 
drawn a lot of interest lately. However, thorough 
performance analysis and validation is still lacking, 
especially regarding the fulfillment of privacy-related 
requirements. In this paper, we put forward a framework to 
assess the capacity of privacy protection solutions to hide 
distinguishing facial information and to conceal identity. We 
then conduct rigorous experiments to evaluate the 
performance of face recognition algorithms applied to 
images altered by privacy protection techniques. Results 
show the ineffectiveness of naïve privacy protection 
techniques such as pixelization and blur. Conversely, they 
demonstrate the effectiveness of more sophisticated 
scrambling techniques to foil face recognition. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Privacy protection is quickly becoming a very central issue 
in video surveillance. While video surveillance can help 
repress crime and terrorism, hence benefiting the society, 
the widespread use of security cameras has led to well 
documented forms of abuse, including: criminal abuse by 
law enforcement officers, institutional abuse by spying upon 
and harassing political activists, abuse for personal purpose 
such as stalking women or estranged girlfriends/spouses, 
discrimination including racial discrimination, voyeurism 
where bored male operators spy on women, and release of 
public camera footage in the public domain. Moreover, its 
big brother nature is hindering wider acceptance of video 
surveillance. 
The perspective of forthcoming powerful video 
analytics tools, combined with pervasive networks of dense 
cameras is further raising the threat of privacy loss.  
Fortunately, recent research results have shown that 
new technologies are emerging with the potential to 
effectively protect privacy, without hampering video 
surveillance tasks. These results challenge the common 
conjecture that increased security should incur a loss in 
privacy. Recent overviews are given in [1][2]. 
The system introduced in [3] relies on computer vision 
to analyze the video content.  Depending on users’ access-
control rights, different versions of the video are then 
presented where privacy-sensitive information is removed.  
Privacy filters are proposed in [4], which operate on 
sensor data to remove privacy-sensitive information. These 
filters are specified using a privacy grammar.  
Data corresponding to faces is encrypted in [5] in order 
to conceal identity. The process is reversible for authorized 
users in possession of the secret encryption key. Similarly, a 
scheme for secure coding of arbitrarily shaped visual objects 
is presented in [6]. 
The methods in [7][8] propose privacy protection 
solutions for JPEG 2000 video. Conditional access control 
techniques are proposed in [7] to scramble Regions of 
Interest (ROI), e.g. people or faces. The scrambling is 
applied either in wavelet-domain or codestream-domain. In 
[8], code-blocks corresponding to ROI are trimmed down to 
the lowest quality layer of the codestream. Subsequently, the 
quality of the ROI can be decreased by limiting the video bit 
rate.   
Two efficient region-based transform-domain and 
codestream-domain scrambling techniques are proposed in 
[9] to hide privacy-sensitive information in MPEG-4 video. 
In the first approach, the sign of selected transform 
coefficients is pseudo-randomly inverted during encoding. 
In the second approach, bits of the codestream are pseudo-
randomly flipped after encoding. The region-based 
transform-domain scrambling is extended to H.264/AVC in 
[10].  
The technique in [11] removes privacy-sensitive 
information from the video sequence. A perceptually-based 
compressed-domain watermarking technique is then used to 
securely embed this data in the video stream. Similarly, a 
secure reversible data hiding technique is introduced in [12] 
for privacy data embedding. A framework for privacy data 
management is also proposed to allow individual users to 
control access to their private data. 
Face recognition techniques pose the threat to 
automatically identify people in a video surveillance scene. 
This issue is addressed in [13], where an algorithm is 
introduced to de-identify faces such that many facial 
characteristics are preserved but the face cannot be reliably 
recognized. It is also shown that simple ad-hoc de-
identification methods do not prevent successful face 
recognition. 
However, although the issue of privacy protection has 
drawn a lot of interest, thorough performance analysis is still 
lacking. In particular, it is paramount to validate proposed 
privacy protection solutions against user and system 
requirements for privacy. Moreover, it is still unclear 
whether current privacy protection approaches can be 
efficiently integrated into existing surveillance architecture 
and deployed in large scale systems. 
The objective of this paper is to define a framework to 
assess the capacity of privacy protection solutions to hide 
distinguishing facial information and to conceal identity. For 
this purpose, we use the Colorado State University (CSU) 
Face Identification Evaluation System [14] to evaluate the 
performance of face recognition algorithms applied to 
images altered by privacy protection techniques. By 
performing extensive and comprehensive experiments on 
the FERET database [15], we show the ineffectiveness of 
naïve privacy protection techniques such as pixelization and 
blur. Conversely, we demonstrate the effectiveness of more 
sophisticated scrambling techniques to foil face recognition.  
This paper is structured as follow. An outline of four 
privacy protection approaches under consideration is given 
in Sec 2. Next, a framework for face identification 
evaluation is presented in Sec. 3. In order to validate privacy 
protection solutions, performance assessment using this 
framework is analyzed in Sec. 4. Finally, conclusions are 
summarized in Sec 5. 
 
2. PRIVACY PROTECTION APPROACHES UNDER 
CONSIDERATION 
 
In this section, we briefly describe four approaches for 
privacy protection that we will subsequently evaluate for 
their capability to hide facial information and to provide 
anonymity. 
As reference, we first consider two naïve methods, 
applying simple pixelization or Gaussian blur. Note that in 
both cases, privacy-sensitive information is lost and the 
process is irreversible. 
We also consider two more sophisticated ROI-based 
transform-domain scrambling methods [10]. Both methods 
are applied jointly with H.264/AVC encoding [16], which is 
becoming the prevalent format in video surveillance 
systems. Two slice groups are defined using Flexible 
Macroblock Ordering to distinguish between the scrambled 
ROI and the unscrambled background. The first method 
pseudo-randomly inverts the sign of transform coefficients 
of blocks belonging to ROI. The second one applies a 
pseudo-random permutation of the transform coefficients in 
blocks corresponding to ROI. These two methods are fully 
reversible. Namely, authorized users, in possession of a 
secret encryption key, can reverse the scrambling process 
and recover the truthful scene. Conversely, other users 
obtain a video sequence where ROI have severe noise, 
concealing privacy-sensitive information. 
These four approaches to provide anonymity are 
detailed in the following subsections. 
 
2.1. Pixelization 
 
We first consider pixelization as a naïve approach for 
privacy protection. Pixelization consists in noticeably 
reducing resolution in ROI. In practice, it can be achieved 
by substituting a square block of pixels with its average. 
Pixelization is commonly used in television news and 
documentaries in order to obscure the faces of suspects, 
witnesses or bystanders to preserve their anonymity. The 
same technique is also used to censor nudity or to avoid 
unintentional product placement on television. 
One drawback of this approach is that integrating pixels 
along trajectories over time may allow to partly recovering 
the concealed information. 
 
2.2. Gaussian Blur 
 
The second naïve approach for privacy protection removes 
details in ROI by applying a Gaussian low pass filter. More 
precisely, the image is convolved with a 2D Gaussian 
function defined by 
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where σ is the standard deviation. Blurring is sometimes 
preferred to pixelization in order to obscure privacy-
sensitive information. 
 
2.3. Scrambling by Random Sign Inversion 
 
Next, we consider a ROI-based transform-domain 
scrambling method for H.264/AVC. It scrambles the 
quantized transform coefficients of each 4x4 block of the 
ROI by pseudo-randomly flipping their sign [10].  
More specifically, defining the vector of quantized 
transform coefficients qcoeff[i] with i=0..15, the scrambling 
consists in performing the following operation for each i 
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Besides being fully reversible, this method offers a 
number of advantages. The same scrambled stream is 
transmitted to all users independently from their access 
rights. The scrambling is confined to ROI, whereas the 
background remains unaltered. Finally, it has a small impact 
in terms of coding efficiency, and requires a low 
computational complexity. 
 
2.4. Scrambling by Random Permutation 
 
Finally, we consider an alternative ROI-based transform-
domain scrambling method for H.264/AVC. In this method, 
a random permutation is applied to rearrange the order of 
transform coefficients in 4x4 blocks corresponding to ROI 
[10]. The random permutation is expressed as follow 
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The Knuth shuffle is used to generate a permutation of n 
items with uniform random distribution. More explicitly, it 
starts from the identity permutation and scans through each 
position i from 0 to 14, swapping the element currently at 
position i with the element at an arbitrarily chosen positions 
from i through 15.  
This method provides the same advantages as the 
scrambling by random sign inversion. 
 
3. FRAMEWORK FOR FACE IDENTIFICATION 
EVALUATION 
 
The objective of this paper is to validate the anonymity 
functionality of privacy protection approaches. For this 
purpose, we use the CSU Face Identification Evaluation 
System (FIES), which provides standard face recognition 
algorithms and standard statistical methods for assessing 
performances [14]. A brief description of the CSU FIES is 
given hereafter. 
 
3.1. Face Recognition 
 
We consider two face recognition algorithms, namely, 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) [17] and Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [18].  
In PCA, also known as eigenfaces, a linear 
transformation is applied to rotate feature vectors from the 
initially large and highly correlated subspace to a smaller 
and uncorrelated subspace. PCA has shown to be effective 
for face recognition. Firstly, it can be used to reduce the 
dimensionality of the feature space. Secondly, it eliminates 
statistical covariance in the transformed feature space. In 
other words, the covariance matrix for the transformed 
feature vectors is always diagonal.  
LDA aims at finding a linear transformation which 
stresses differences between classes while lessening 
differences within classes, where a class corresponds to all 
images of a given individual. The resulting transformed 
subspace is linearly separable between classes. In [18], PCA 
is first performed to reduce the feature space dimensionality. 
LDA is then applied to further decrease the dimensionality 
while safeguarding the distinctive characteristics of the 
classes. The final subspace is obtained by multiplying the 
PCA and LDA basis vectors. 
 
3.2. Face Identification and Evaluation System 
 
The CSU FIES is composed of four main components: 
image pre-processing, training, testing and performance 
analysis [14].  
The preprocessing step aims at reducing detrimental 
variations between images. Faces are firstly aligned using 
information about the eye coordinates. Then, pixel values 
are equalized and contrast and brightness are normalized. 
The next step is training. Its purpose is to create the 
subspace into which test images are subsequently projected 
and matched. Training is performed using a training set of 
images. 
In the testing step, a distance matrix is computed in the 
transformed subspace for all test images. In our 
experiments, we use a Euclidian distance for PCA and the 
soft distance proposed in [18] for LDA. At this stage, two 
image sets are defined: the gallery set is made of known 
faces, whereas the probe set corresponds to faces to be 
recognized. 
 Finally, face recognition performance is analyzed. 
More specifically, a cumulative match curve is generated. 
For this purpose, for each probe image, the recognition rank 
is computed. Namely, a rank 0 means that the best match is 
of the same subject, a rank 1 means that the best match is 
from another person but the second best match is of the 
same subject, etc. Then, the cumulative match curve is 
obtained by summing the number of correct matches for 
each rank.  
 
4. PRIVACY PROTECTION PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
 
We now describe experiments carried out in order to assess 
privacy protection solutions. Results are then reported and 
analyzed.  
 
4.1. Test data 
 
In this paper, we use the grayscale Facial Recognition 
Technology (FERET) database [15] to carry out 
experiments. Indeed, this database is widely used for face 
recognition research, although it is not representative of 
typical video surveillance footage. From this database, we 
consider a subset of 3368 images of frontal faces for which 
eye coordinates are available. The images have 256 by 384 
pixels with eight-bit per pixel. We further consider two 
series of images denoted by ‘fa’ and ‘fb’. The ‘fa’ indicates 
a regular frontal image, and the ‘fb’ indicates an alternative 
frontal image, taken within seconds of the corresponding 
‘fa’ image, where a different facial expression was 
requested from the subject.  
In our experiments, we use standard training, gallery 
and probe sets from the FERET test. More specifically, the 
training set includes 501 images from the ‘fa’ series. In turn, 
the gallery set is composed of 1196 from the ‘fa’ series, 
whereas the probe set is made of 1195 images from the ‘fb’ 
series. 
 
4.2. Sample Images with Privacy Protection 
 
The results of the four privacy protection approaches 
described in Sec. 2, namely pixelization, Gaussian blur, 
scrambling by random sign inversion and scrambling by 
random permutation are illustrated in Fig. 1 for a sample 
image of the FERET database. 
The four privacy protection techniques could be used in 
video sequences, and to hide information in ROI. 
Nevertheless, hereafter we simply apply them to still images 
and to obscure the whole picture. In particular, both region-
based transform-domain scrambling approaches are applied 
jointly with H.264/AVC encoding. In this paper, as we deal 
with still images, we straightforwardly use the H.264/AVC 
Intra coding mode.  
Note that the effect of the privacy protection techniques 
could be slightly different when applied to video sequences. 
 
4.3. Face Recognition Performance Analysis 
 
We now evaluate the capacity of privacy protection 
solutions to hide distinguishing facial information in order 
to foil face recognition techniques and hence to conceal the 
identity of a person. 
Similarly to [13], we study different types of attack. In 
the first round of experiments, we consider a simple attack 
where training and gallery sets are made of unaltered 
images. Conversely, probe set corresponds to images with 
privacy protection. In other words, altered images are 
merely processed by the face recognition algorithms without 
taking into account the fact that privacy protection tools 
have been applied.  
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show cumulative match curves for 
PCA and LDA respectively, comparing the recognition rate 
as a function of the rank for original image data as well as 
for the four considered privacy protection approaches. 
It can be observed that for both PCA and LDA schemes 
applied on original images, recognition rate is superior to 
70% at rank 0 (i.e. the best match is of the same subject as 
the probe), and superior to 90% at rank 50.  
When applying a Gaussian blur, the performance drops 
radically for LDA. However, recognition rate remains high 
for PCA with 56% success at rank 0. Pixelization fares 
worse. The recognition rate is 56% and 13% at rank 0 for 
PCA and LDA respectively. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
    
c) 
 
d) 
    
e) 
 
 
Fig. 1. Examples of privacy protection approaches: a) original 
image, b) pixelization with a block size of 16, c) Gaussian blur 
with a standard deviation σ=8, d) scrambling by random sign 
inversion, e) scrambling by random permutation. 
 
However, results clearly show that both region-based 
transform-domain scrambling approaches are successful at 
hiding identity. The recognition rate is nearly 0% at rank 0, 
and remains below 10% at rank 50, for both PCA and LDA 
algorithms. In addition, it can be observed that both random 
sign inversion and random permutation schemes achieve 
nearly the same performance. 
In the second round of experiments, we consider a more 
sophisticated attack. Namely, privacy protection tools are 
now applied to all images in the training, gallery and probe 
sets. This corresponds to an attacker which gets access to 
protected data. Alternatively, an attacker may attempt 
replicating the alteration due to privacy protection 
techniques on his own training and gallery sets. Fig. 4 and 
Fig. 5 show corresponding cumulative match curves for 
PCA and LDA respectively. 
With Gaussian blur, the performance remains nearly 
identical. It even improves slightly for LDA. Pixelization is 
not much better at hiding facial information. The 
recognition rate is still 45% and 17% at rank 0 for PCA and 
LDA respectively. 
Finally, both region-based transform-domain 
scrambling approaches are again successful at hiding 
identity. The recognition rate is nearly 0% at rank 0 for both 
PCA and LDA algorithms. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cumulative match curve for PCA with Euclidian distance: 
performance comparison of privacy protection solutions (unaltered 
images in training and gallery sets, altered images in probe set). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Cumulative match curve for LDA with soft distance: 
performance comparison of privacy protection solutions (unaltered 
images in training and gallery sets, altered images in probe set). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Cumulative match curve for PCA with Euclidian distance: 
performance comparison of privacy protection solutions (altered 
images in training, gallery and probe sets). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Cumulative match curve for LDA with soft distance: 
performance comparison of privacy protection solutions (altered 
images in training, gallery and probe sets). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper is a step forward in the assessment of privacy 
protection solutions. More specifically, we have described a 
framework to verify the effectiveness of privacy protection 
techniques at hiding distinguishing facial information and 
hence concealing identity.  
We have conducted rigorous and comprehensive 
experiments using PCA and LDA face recognition 
algorithms on the FERET database. Results have shown that 
applying Gaussian blur or pixelization is ineffective at 
providing anonymity. In both cases, the recognition rate 
remains significant. Finally, results have shown that region-
based transform-domain scrambling approaches are 
successful at hiding identity, with the recognition rate 
dropping to nearly 0%. 
Future work will concentrate in further analyzing the 
performance of privacy protection solutions, verifying that 
they can successfully address privacy issues. In addition, it 
is important to carry out experiments using more realistic 
video surveillance footage. It is also imperative to better 
understand user and system requirements regarding privacy 
protection. Finally, performance analysis should also 
include the impact on compression efficiency, complexity, 
and security against attacks. 
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